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Harmony & Cancellation Culture
Erica Stonestreet asks, are we too quick these days to break off relationships?
I was recently sent an email calling me out for hurting the sender’s feelings. The sender was entirely right to do
so; my offense was inadvertent, but it did cause harm. The email ended with, ‘No need to respond.’ That stopped
me short, because of course my first impulse was to apologize. I wasn’t sure what to do with ‘No need to
respond.’ If the sender actually wanted me not to respond, they were denying any interest in an apology, cutting
off my impulse to try to repair the relationship. If instead the comment was meant to relieve me of guilt, then it
failed, since being told I’d hurt someone’s feelings naturally called up the minor guilt that comes with such
inadvertent blunders; and guilt motivates apologies. It’s a handy feeling in that respect, despite – actually,
because of – our dislike of it. And why else point out the infraction, if not to make an implicit demand for
repair?
This was not remotely as strong as the shaming that takes place in a ‘cancelling’ of someone, but because this
was a person with whom I had gotten along well, I felt abruptly cut off, and so the word ‘cancelled’ came to
mind.
‘Cancel culture’ and ‘cancellation’ are now widely used, and at this point are heavily politicized, but are very
nebulous terms. Cancellation can be about economics and influence, depriving people of the chance to profit
from their disrespect and mistreatment of others, for example. It can also be about power on a smaller, more
interpersonal scale, as when a teenager ‘cancels’ another because he sang along with offensive lyrics. What all
the different uses seem to have in common is the idea of taking back power: a cancellation is a way of pushing
against perceived insult on institutional or personal levels by withdrawing from connection with people who use
their platform in what are perceived to be harmful ways. But like many grassroots democratic processes, the
term ‘cancelled’ and the act of cancelling are both used and misused, and the phenomenon is messy and
controversial. It’s not difficult for a reasonable person to appreciate the general idea in some cases, but still
worry about where it leads, as there is often an element of the denial of free speech on the side of cancellers.
Because it was entirely private, and because I do have an ongoing relationship with the sender, my own
experience with the email cutoff was probably not a true instance of cancellation. But I felt momentarily
cancelled, and as I processed the incident, I connected it with a value concept that isn’t discussed much in the
ongoing conversation about the value and disvalue of cancellation, or even with respect to culture more
generally: harmony.
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Making sweet music together in medieval Belgium

The Value of Harmony
The value of harmony is tricky to pin down, and the desire for harmony can cause us to accept things we
shouldn’t. In my ‘Philosophy of Human Nature’ class, I’ve used a few letters from Theano and Periktione, two
Pythagorean women who give domestic advice rooted in the ancient Pythagorean school’s central value of
harmonia, ‘fitting together’. Some of it is recognizable even today as good advice: love but don’t spoil your
children; treat servants well. But one letter from Theano to a woman named Nikostrate advises the latter not to
make a fuss over her husband’s cheating on her. The reasoning is that the disharmony in his behavior won’t be
made better by her breaking off the relationship. Theano asserts that what he needs in order to see the error of his
ways is Nikostrate demonstrating harmony, in this case, by letting go of her resentment.
To my students, on a first pass this is almost laughable advice. Surely not!
This was my first reaction too. These days, women have more power and can frequently afford not to tolerate
infidelity. But in teaching, I always try to present the most charitable reading of the material that I can before
turning a critical eye. And in doing so here, I noticed a connection to certain strands of contemporary feminist
thought found in care ethics and elsewhere that emphasize the importance and implications of our relationships
with others. I haven’t seen the term ‘harmony’ used in this literature, but the concept strikes me as apt. Harmony
is primarily about maintaining flourishing relationships in the face of inevitable friction, slip-ups, blunders, and
disagreements. Harmony isn’t about rolling over to keep the peace. That’s likely to make false peace. Someone
who gives up their interests for the sake of not making waves isn’t getting their voice heard or their needs met,
and is allowing others to dominate. The appearance of harmony when we stay silent in the face of a misuse of
power is merely superficial. Instead, harmony requires the constant tuning of relationships so that everyone is
heard and valued, everyone is held accountable for their actions, and liveable compromises can be forged.
It’s worth noting here that harmony isn’t just about governing behavior, it’s also about governing feelings. And
here too we need to walk a delicate line. Harmony isn’t about suppressing legitimate feelings, it’s about tuning
feelings so that they are appropriate to the situation. What that means is, of course, another sticky problem.
When are which feelings appropriate? For example, we ought to resent harms to ourselves and those we love; we
ought to feel guilty when we have done wrong; we ought to feel pride when we or our loved ones have achieved
something good; and so on. As Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics, we must do, and feel, the right things
at the right times, toward the right objects. In ‘Love and Knowledge: Emotions in Feminist Epistemology’
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(1989), Alison Jaggar proposes the following test: “I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are
characteristic of a society in which all humans (and perhaps some non-human life too) thrive, or if they are
conducive to establishing such a society.” Very often emotions are indicators that things in our relationships are
right, or wrong. Jaggar’s overall point is that they are sources of knowledge.
But emotions do require training. I know from experience that part of the work of raising children is to teach
them emotional intelligence: to recognize their feelings, and to reflect on them so that they are able to assess
whether what they are feeling is proportionate to the situation. It’s not worth throwing a temper tantrum over
having to do some school work that, when you sit down to it, will take you less than ten minutes and which is
actually well within your ability.
So part of what Theano is advising Nikostrate when she urges the latter to turn down the volume on her
righteous jealousy, is not that she must grin and bear it in the sense of hiding her jealousy and putting on a show
that things are fine. Rather, where harmony is a primary value, what Nikostrate must do is to respond
harmoniously to a disharmonious world. She must find a restorative way to react to the situation. Her resentment
is a valid signal that she has been wronged; the next step is not to cling to and act out of jealousy, but to address
the problem with an eye to harmony.
Perhaps we modern Westerners still find this advice jarring. After all, if we have been wronged, there should be
justice. But the idea would not be surprising in many other cultures. Buddhism, for one, teaches that all emotions
– not just the negative ones – cause suffering, because they cause us to cling to the impermanent and so to fight
the reality that everything changes. A desire for harmony would not deny the need for justice, but it would have
us adjust our understanding of what justice consists in. Rather than a confrontational justice that opposes and
fights, harmony would have us tune into a restorative justice that sees and hears others. This is a justice that
begins from the premise that we are all related and should act to preserve relationship. Breaking off the
relationship, as cancelling does, would not be a first move, but a last resort.
I think the analogy to music (very Pythagorean) in my use of the term ‘tune into’ is an apt one when talking
about harmony. Good music involves carefully arranging consonance and dissonance in expressive ways. Too
much dissonance grates on the ear; too much consonance results in uninteresting music. In a recent article titled
‘Soup, Harmony, and Disagreement’ (2020), David Wong, claiming more familiarity with the culinary than the
musical arts, makes the analogy to soup: the flavors need to be balanced in order to construct a harmonious
whole out of contrasting ingredients. Wong defends an interpretation of harmony that makes room for
disagreement against more traditional views that claim that Confucianism requires conformity and the
subordination of individual interests to those of a group. Wong’s theory is that harmony can encompass a
constructive use of difference, as in soup or music; of shared understanding, as when disparate interests
converge around common values; and of accommodation, as when the will to maintain relationships causes
apparently disharmonious parties to accommodate sometimes deep disagreement.
It’s this last aspect of harmony that is directly threatened by cancel culture. When accommodation ceases, the
possibility of shared understanding is also threatened, and differences become divisive rather than constructive.
When people disconnect from one another rather than engage, they stand up for their own values, yes: but they
do not stand up for the value of relationship. They use the justice that fights rather than the justice that heals
(although in ‘In Defense of Cancel Culture’ (2019), Shamira Ibrahim emphasizes that cancellation can actually
sometimes lead to genuine learning and apology). Ironically, the power of cancelling comes in part from the
value of relationship: the reason why a cancellation has power is that it ostracizes someone, and most people feel
that sort of cut-off keenly – as I did.

Between Me & Us
Cancelling as it’s practiced now, particularly when it is a first rather than a last resort, is a product of, and is
perhaps an inevitable extension of, individualism. Individualism construes self-interest quite narrowly, as limited
to the interests of a person taken in isolation. It’s a major operating principle behind capitalism and liberal
democracy as we know them. And cancelling has close ties to both: public cancellings may be about preventing
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the cancelled from profiting from their views; and the phenomenon has also been described as a democratizing
process because it allows ordinary folks to exercise power over the powerful.
Individualism has brought us many blessings, but perhaps we should also be examining its limits. In ‘Ethics: The
We and the I’ (2004), Dr Viola F. Cordova – the first North American indigenous woman to earn a Ph.D. in
Philosophy – wrote of the contrast between ‘I’ ethics and ‘We’ ethics. In an I-ethic, the ‘primary bargaining unit’
is the individual. Ethics is still about how to get along with one another, but the premise in I-ethics is that the
individual’s values and interests are the starting point. Most current Western theories of ethics fall into this
category, since they were developed against a background of individualism. In a We-ethic, by contrast,
relationship is primary. Individuals are valued, of course, but they’re valued as parts of a whole. When disputes
arise (though Cordova does not use these words) the focus is on restoring harmony through accommodation:
recognizing the value of all members and aiming to accommodate their interests. Cordova points out that a Weethic includes a radical sort of equality, such that entities discounted in much Western ethics, including children
and nature, are considered equal, and given equal consideration when conflicts arise. In Wong’s version of it,
accommodation has different facets: epistemic openness, willingness to minimize damage to others when acting
out one’s own values, and willingness to compromise.
A We-ethic would not cancel people. When relationship is the uppermost value, engagement is the first
approach: calling in instead of calling out. Cancelling is a way of standing up for values, and it’s a powerful
expressive act. But it is individualistic in that it puts those values ahead of relationship. A cancelling is precisely
a signal that one set of people (perhaps a set of one person) no longer wishes to be in relationship with another. It
is as if the carrots decided to leave the soup because they could no longer be complicit with the taste of the
onions. But if they do, the whole soup is thrown out of whack – which we can’t allow if we want the physical
and spiritual nourishment of a good meal.
So what do we lose when we cancel? One of the objections that critics of cancellation – perhaps most notably
Barack Obama – raise, is that it insists on a moral purity that’s impossible to achieve. Most of the well-known
figures in history were morally flawed – just as most of the rest of us are, too. To narrow our sights to just a
handful of the most famous men in European philosophical history, what do we do with Aristotle, David Hume,
Immanuel Kant, or Martin Heidegger? They were all avowedly racist, sexist, or both (and more). Yet they all
had important philosophical ideas, out of which has grown much of what is good about our society and
institutions. Ignoring these ideas would greatly impoverish philosophy, as well as obscuring the truth of
European intellectual history. As Victor Abundez-Guerra (‘How to Deal with Kant’s Racism – In and Out of the
Classroom’, 2018), Agnes Callard (‘Should we Cancel Aristotle?’, 2020), and others have argued, we cannot
excerpt the good parts and leave the bad parts behind in any principled way. But, they add, we should not cancel
them. For better and worse, we are in relationship with them.
With the values of relationship and harmony as our background, instead of cancelling, we must strive to restore
harmony by making use of the dissonance that moral flaws introduce. We must show how people’s good ideas
are entangled with their bad ones, and we must think hard about the values we share with them, and how to
accommodate the differences we have with them – that is, study how to live with people in recognition of our
deep disagreements with them. Like it or not, we cannot truly cancel these philosophers anyway: their legacy has
made Western society what it is, and it will not be ignored or silenced. So we must face their imperfections and
try to make something harmonious out of them, just as in tonal Western music we come back to rest in
consonance no matter how dissonant the journey from exposition to coda.
Harmony is not just an ancient value, or only prized in cultures outside the West. Many contemporary feminists,
particularly those in care ethics, emphasize the value of relationship. As I said, as far as I know, they don’t
generally cite ‘harmony’ as a named value. One of the things that care ethicists insist on, however, is self-care.
Care as a value and as a practice insists that all people in the situation, including ourselves, deserve to be seen
and cared for – an insistence that echoes the equality built into Cordova’s We-ethics. So although we are
relational creatures first and foremost, and do well to work within that conception of ourselves, when our
relationships become truly poisonous, then we must end them. The difficult issue is knowing when that is. When
do we give up on a relationship and separate ourselves from what is truly toxic? In other words, when is
cancellation the right thing to do?
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I don’t think I can offer a principled answer to this question. Perhaps no one can. But hopefully we’ll know it
when we see it. We should accommodate day-to-day hurt feelings and principled disagreement; we should never
accommodate hatred or abuse. There is a vast array of situations in-between, however, and like so many things,
the line separating what to accommodate and what not to is gray and blurry. Perhaps there is no precise,
principled line of demarcation, then, only a gray zone, and we must exercise practical wisdom for each situation.
Today, rather than accepting the things we cannot change, we are in the process of changing the things we
cannot accept (to paraphrase Angela Davis playing on Reinhold Niebuhr’s words). That is a powerful way to
make progress, and it can be done harmoniously or not. The question upon which these turbulent times hinges, I
think, is whether individualism will finally stamp out any hope of harmony alongside disagreement, or whether
instead we will manage to put the value of relationship ahead of our differences and reframe our disputes, large
and political, or small and personal, in terms of shared values and accommodation. Because of its relationship to
democracy and power, cancelling is an important tool. But if it becomes one of the primary ways we exercise
power, then we are spoiling our cultural soup.
© Erica Stonestreet 2022
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